Europe’s hidden strategic fuel reserve

Europe’s hidden strategic fuel reserve

Europe’s energy-security debate has focused on gas, power and emergency stocks while a major vulnerability remains in plain sight: diesel. On 2 October, the G7 agreed a coordinated release of 100 million barrels of diesel and other emergency reserves through the International Energy Agency.
Europe should also mobilise a renewable reserve that does not need to be stockpiled: its existing biodiesel production base.
EWABA’s updated analysis confirms that moving broadly from B7 to B10 could displace around 4-5 million tonnes of fossil diesel annually – equivalent to roughly 8-10 days of EU road-diesel demand.
The response is practical: enable B10; preserve targeted B7 safeguards for proportional fueling stations; remove blanket protection-grade barriers; enforce sustainability and traceability harder; and use targeted fiscal measures to ensure favourable blending economics can reach consumers.

Fuel security is the unfinished part of energy security

Europe has learned that import dependence is a strategic liability. Yet diesel remains the bloodstream of freight, farming, construction and commercial transport.
Transport accounted for 32.3% of EU final energy consumption in 2024. The latest detailed modal breakdown shows that road transport consumed 10,974 PJ in 2023, representing 73% of all transport energy use. Gas and diesel derived oil alone provided 64% of road-transport energy, while fossil fuels collectively accounted for approximately 93% (Eurostat, 2025).
Oil dependence is even starker. Eurostat’s latest completed indicator puts EU import dependency for oil at approximately 95% in 2023. In 2024, the EU still met 57% of its overall energy needs through net imports, with oil and petroleum products accounting for 67% of all energy imports (Eurostat, 2026).
The vulnerability has become more visible in 2026. In the second quarter, the value of EU petroleum-oil imports was 55.8% above the 2025 monthly average while volumes were only 1.2% higher. Europe was not consuming dramatically more oil; it was simply paying much more for exposure to an increasingly volatile international market.

The B7-to-B10 opportunity is strategic, not marginal

The strategic question is straightforward: while diesel remains essential to the European economy, how much imported fossil diesel could instead be displaced by renewable fuel that Europe is already capable of producing?
Europe already has another buffer: sustainable biodiesel produced, but underutilised in existing European plants, increasingly from wastes and residues and usable through infrastructure already in place.
B10 is not an experimental fuel. It is covered by European standard EN 16734, while updated industry guidance promoted in March 2026 compiled higher-blend approvals from 20 vehicle and engine manufacturers (AGQM, 2026).
Applying conservative adjustments for hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO) already present in the pool, non-uniform national blending across the EU, seasonal operability, and real-world blending behaviour, moving from B7 to B10 could result in approximately 4-5 million tonnes of additional biodiesel demand per year. It is an estimate rather than a forecast, but the order of magnitude is robust. That is roughly 8–10 days of annual EU road-diesel demand or around 30–37 million barrels on a diesel-equivalent basis.
Another comparison illustrates the scale. Reuters reported that India supplied the EU with an average 137,000 barrels per day of diesel in 2025, making it the bloc’s third-largest supplier.
Those flows stopped in January 2026 when new EU restrictions on fuels refined from Russian crude took effect, triggering another reshuffling of supply towards the US and Middle East. 30 to 37 million barrels is equivalent to roughly seven to nine months of those historic Indian diesel flows.
The point is not that biodiesel can substitute international oil trade. It is simpler: every additional tonne of sustainable biodiesel produced and used in Europe is fossil diesel that Europe does not have to secure from a volatile external market.

Markets are already moving beyond B7

European countries do not need to invent the policy model. France already markets B10 and permits B30 and B100 for captive fleets with dedicated logistics. In September, President Emmanuel Macron went further, asking the European Commission to enable wider replacement of B7 with B10 specifically to provide additional flexibility and support diesel supply.
Belgium’s official fuel framework covers B7, B10, B20 and B30.
In Portugal, commercial B15 was being offered in 160+ fueling stations. Italy has taken a particularly relevant approach to the B7 protection grade: its 2026 framework requires B7 availability in at least 30% of relevant filling stations in each province, rather than obliging every individual filling station to maintain both grades, setting the scene for B10 across the country.
Outside Europe, the contrast is sharper. Indonesia moved nationwide to B50 in July 2026 and had extended the blend to more than 6,000 filling stations by September.
Brazil has required B15 since August 2025 and is already preparing technical testing for blends beyond B15.
Malaysia began its phased transition from B10 towards B15 in June, with higher blends envisaged thereafter. In the United States, states such as Iowa actively encourage higher biodiesel blends, with tax incentives supporting B11, B20 and even B30 and higher blends at the pump.
These markets use different feedstocks, policy instruments and sustainability frameworks, and Europe should not copy them mechanically. But they demonstrate something important: higher biodiesel use such as B10 or B15 is fundamentally a policy choice, not a technical one.
The International Energy Agency makes the security case explicit. In 2024, liquid biofuels reduced transport-fuel import dependence by 5-15 % in relevant importing countries and lowered global oil demand by around 2.5 million barrels per day compared with a world without their contribution (IEA, 2025).

RED III still limits the potential of waste-based fuels

RED III raises Europe’s transport ambition, requiring member states by 2030 to achieve either a 29% renewable-energy share in transport or a 14.5% reduction in transport GHG intensity.
Yet it continues to cap the contribution of fuels produced from Annex IX Part B feedstocks at 1.7% of transport energy, unless member states obtain approval for a higher limit.
As EWABA has highlighted, this increasingly restricts the contribution of sustainable waste-based biodiesel even as the eligible Part B feedstock base has expanded since 2024. Raising the cap – and reconsidering its necessity beyond 2030 – would allow these fuels to contribute more fully to Europe’s fuel security, decarbonisation and circular-economy objectives.
In addition, RED III’s effect creates divergent national compliance signals and investment uncertainty. On RED III revision or else RED IV, the aim should be to align the transposition and implementation across member states.

Market flexibility needs stronger enforcement, not weaker standards

Removing unnecessary market barriers must not mean weakening sustainability safeguards. For the waste-based and advanced biodiesel industry, the opposite is essential.
EWABA supports stronger traceability, certification, risk-based auditing and anti-fraud enforcement. The organisation’s March 2026 position paper notes that the Union Database for Biofuels (UDB) has strengthened certification and cross-border verification, providing increasingly robust tools for tracing feedstocks and identifying fraud. As those systems mature, sustainability risks should be addressed directly through enforcement rather than indirectly through rigid restrictions on otherwise eligible fuels.
The policy principle should therefore be straightforward: regulate sustainability rigorously, while allowing verified low-carbon fuels to compete on their actual climate and security-of-supply value. Where B10 is technically compatible, it should be easier to place on the market.
Higher blends such as B20, B30 and B100 should likewise be enabled for suitable captive and commercial fleets under the relevant standards and manufacturer approvals. EWABA identifies these higher blends as already deployable options for existing diesel applications.

Unlock the reserve – and incentivise it properly

The policy principle should be simple: liberalise higher sustainable blending, not sustainability standards.
Member states should enable B10 as a mainstream diesel grade for compatible vehicles and require manufacturers to keep vehicle-compatibility information transparent and current. B7 should remain clearly available through proportionate network coverage rather than protection-grade rules that force every filling station to duplicate storage and dispensing infrastructure.
Governments should also consider targeted and temporary fiscal measures where biodiesel economics can translate into lower prices for motorists and businesses. German industry calculations reported by WELT indicate that B10 could have been offered for up to three cents per litre less than B7 during the first half of 2026. Such savings are market-dependent rather than guaranteed; but regulation should not prevent consumers from benefiting when the economics favour higher renewable blending.
EWABA’s industry mapping identifies more than 70 waste-based and advanced biodiesel facilities operating across Europe, many located in regional and rural economies. Greater utilisation would support existing industrial capacity, local employment and waste-collection value chains while substituting additional imported fossil diesel. Existing utilisation rates for EWABA members’ production linger at approximately 50%, far from their real potential.
Higher biodiesel blends will not solve every energy-security challenge. But they can replace millions of tonnes of fossil diesel using vehicles, production assets and distribution infrastructure that already exist. Europe has petroleum reserves that it draws upon in emergencies. It should also recognise the renewable reserve it can replenish every year.
The fuel exists. The plants exist. The standards exist. Europe now needs the market rules to use them.
The next step is to stop treating sustainable biodiesel only as a compliance instrument and start recognising it for what it can also be: a true European security-of-supply asset.

For more information: Visit ewaba.eu. This articles was written by Leonidas Kanonis, the organisation’s director of communications and analysis.





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